This chapter present the major experiences in the world, best practices and lesson learned from large scale and combined disasters.
In order to analyze the weaknesses in disaster management that were realized from combined and large-scale disasters, an international survey was conducted to countries that suffered from major disasters. Table 5.2.1.4.1.1 provides the details of the international survey.
| Survey items | Description |
|---|---|
| Survey date | From May 2013 to May 2014 |
| Survey countries | Member countries of PIARC TC1.5 The countries that suffered from recent well-known major hazard |
| Survey form | Character of the disaster Major difficulty in disaster management ITS application in disaster management Review and lessons in terms of the key-words below Robustness Self-sustainedness Dynamic risk management |
Thirteen case studies were collected through the survey. Table 5.2.1.4.1.2 provides a list of these.
| Disaster | Reporter |
|---|---|---|
1 | [Large scale disaster –Large-] 1994 Northridge Earthquake, USA | Herby LISSADE Chief, Office of emergency Caltrans, USA |
2 | [Large scale disaster –Large-] 1995 Kobe Earthquake, Japan | Yukio ADACHI Chief maintenance engineer, Hanshin expressway, JAPAN |
3 | [Combined disaster -Simultaneous & Chain-] 2005 Hurricane Katrina, USA | James LAMBERT Professor University of Virginia, USA |
4 | [Large scale disaster –Large-] 2007 Tabasco flood, Mexico | Gustavo MORENO President, SESPEC MEXICO |
5 | [Combined disaster - Simultaneous -] 2009 Taiwan heavy rain, Taiwan | Chin-Fa, CHEN Directorate General of Highways MOTC, Taiwan |
6 | [Large scale disaster -Uncommon-] 2010 Eruption of Volcano Merapi, Indonesia | Djoko MURJANTO Director general of highways MOI, Indonesia |
7 | [Large scale disaster -Uncommon-] 2010 Chemical Spill, Hungary | Csilla KAMARAS Engineer National Transport Authority, Hungary |
8
| [Large scale disaster -Large-] 2010 Romania flood, Romania | Constantin ZBARNEA Regional Division of Roads and Bridges Iasi ROMANIA |
9 | [Combined disaster - Simultaneous -] 2011 East Japan earthquake, Japan | Yukio ADACHI Chief maintenance engineer, Hanshin expressway, JAPAN |
10 | [Large scale disaster –Large-] 2011 Kii Peninsula Heavy Rain, Japan | Yukio ADACHI Chief maintenance engineer, Hanshin expressway, JAPAN |
11
| [Large scale disaster -Uncommon-] 2012 Cameroon flood, Cameroon | Francis NDOUMBA MOUELLE Kizito NGOA Cameroon |
12 | [Large scale disaster -Large-] 2012 Waioeka Gorge Slip, New Zealand | Brett GLIDDON State Highway Manager New Zealand Transport Agency, New Zealand |
13 | [Large scale disaster -Large-] 2013 Queensland flood, Australia | Andrew EXCELL Regional Manager MeTRO, DPTI, Australia |
The collected experiences were categorized into uncommon disaster, large-scale disaster, simultaneously occurring disaster, and chain reaction disasters based on their mode, frequency of occurrence, scale, and status (see Table 5.2.1.4.1.3).
| Main characteristics | Disaster mode | Ocurrence | Scale of single disaster | Disaster status | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Large scale disasters | Uncommon | Single | Very rare | Medium | Does not change | |
Large scale | Rare | Large | ||||
Combined disasters | Simultaneously ocurring | Multiple | Simultaneous | Simultaneous | Does not change | |
Chain-reaction | Multiple | Consecutive | Consecutive | Changes with time | ||
Table 5.2.1.4.1.4 provides a description for the aforementioned categorizations and the collected case studies for each.
Major lessons collected from recent disaster experiences can be classified into four fields: Pre/post event management, road network, communication-coordination-cooperation, and information management, as shown in figure 5.2.1.4.2.1 – Field classification of case studies from International survey.
Figure 5.2.1.4.2.1 – Field classification of case studies from International survey
Depending on the preparedness of the affected sites, differences in disaster management are observed in each field.
There are two major hazard modes. One mode consists of slow-onset hazards such as floods, tropical storms, snow, etc., while the other mode consists of rapid-onset hazards such as earthquakes. The learned lessons are quite different between these modes. Lessons learned from slow-onset disasters are related to pre-event activities aiming to reduce or mitigate the disaster.
The most important lesson derived from the 2005 Hurricane Katrina in USA, was that there had been no preparation for mass evacuation. Mass evacuation requires coordination of several different field organizations and communication between road administrators and evacuees. Mass evacuation strategy has since been studied by FHWA and included in several references. Mass evacuation is approached from an evacuation management angle rather than traffic management.
The case of the 2007 Tabasco heavy rain event in Mexico was considered the result of the slowest onset disaster caused by climate change effects. Some engineers pointed out that this event should serve as a trigger for studies such as “Development of adaptation strategy against extreme events” and “Study on climate change effects to infrastructures”.
A redundant road network is necessary for disaster management. The derived lessons related to road network are also different between the network development levels. The major lesson is that construction of a redundant road network should be considered when designing and developing the network. For networks already under operation, major lessons derived are related to the quality of the road infrastructure (e.g. reliability and resistive infrastructure) and the standards of the road network.
In the case of the 2000 chemical spill in Hungary, the sole lifeline road was closed due to the spilled sludge for a long time. This road closure, combined with poor infrastructure of the road network, resulted in extreme difficulties in the transportation of logistics due to limited access of freight traffic to the disaster area.
In the case of the 2011 East Japan earthquake, areas hit by the tsunami were isolated due to the loss of a major road network caused by the tsunami and due to damage to local roads caused by the earthquake. High quality road network projects from now on take disaster resilience into consideration for the project cost-benefit analysis [4.2.4].
Coordination is very important in managing disasters. Coordination depends on the preparedness of the road authority, related organizations, and society. Coordination work is a process that can be enhanced by good communication among related organizations and road users, and coordination and cooperation between road and non-road related organizations, as shown in Figure 5.2.1.4.2.2.
Figure 5.2.1.4.2.2 – Communication development process and coordination pyramid
According to the experience of the 2010 Merapi volcano eruption in Indonesia, the major lesson was the limited communication and coordination between related disaster management organizations, which resulted in poor quality of the disaster work. Communication is the first step in coordination.
Advance preparedness in coordination is to make cooperative agreements with related organizations prior to the upcoming event. According to the lessons derived from disaster experiences in Japan, most road authorities prepare such cooperative agreements not only with construction contractors and consultant companies, but also with non-road related organizations [4.2.5].
Disaster information management is very important for managing disasters. Disaster information management includes:
Lessons regarding inadequate acquisition of disaster information can also be derived from the case of the 1995 Kobe earthquake in Japan, where recognition of damage level and area in the road network was very difficult; conventional communication tools were not available because of the disaster.
Similar lessons were derived from the 2011 East Japan earthquake, where electricity-based communication and information tools were inactive because of power shutdowns due to the strong earthquake and the tsunami that followed. In the case of the 2011 Kii peninsula heavy rain in Japan, long term hazard monitoring was needed to prevent secondary disasters.
An interesting and important lesson was derived from the 2009 Morakot heavy rain in Taiwan. Even though the most advanced early warning system throughout the country was in place, public awareness was limited. This resulted in improper activation of the preparedness action that was supposed to follow based on the message delivered by the warning system. As a result, the Taiwanese government acted to further promote public disaster awareness. ITS technologies are important disaster management tools for information management and for raising public awareness.
The derived lessons from each field are summarized in Table 5.2.1.4.2.1
The coordination pyramid including road related organizations and non-road related organizations is shown in Figure 5.2.1.4.3. Within the road-related organizations, efforts have been made for communication and coordination. Coordination is a fundamental process in disaster management and should be enhanced within road-related organizations in order to mitigate further damages due to the disaster.
According to the report regarding the 1995 Northridge earthquake in USA, an advanced approach coordination center was established shortly after the earthquake. This center controls coordinative actions under the power of the state government.
Other advanced approaches to improve coordination have been introduced by Japan. According to these, liaison engineers and task-force engineers are sent to the disaster area in order to promote coordinated restoration actions between national and local governments. This system not only promotes coordinated action but also supports engineering issues to be solved in disasters.
The most advanced preparedness actions are being introduced in Japan. According to the lessons derived from the 2011 East Japan Earthquake, some road authorities are trying to implement mutual cooperative action not only within road related organizations but also with non-road related organizations. This involves making agreements in advance and periodical disaster exercises and drills are carried out among the agreement organizations. The agreements are usually made between national and local governments, road authorities, construction contractors, and consultant companies. The report of the 2011 East Japan earthquake outlines that quick inspection and restoration work could be initiated because of these mutual agreements. Mutual agreements with non-road related organizations such as mass media and NPOs are needed as preparedness actions for future events.
Currently, ITS technology is highly developed and it is being applied to improve traffic and safety management. Risk and disaster management are no exception.
An advanced application in the field of disaster management was reported in 2013 in Australia. The flood prediction and road closure possibility information were provided by VMS. The driver survey revealed that information dissemination using ITS technology was very effective for route selection. The continuous challenge for application of ITS technology in risk and disaster management is a continuous challenge and further research is needed in this field.
Case studies from the international survey that identify some good system developments to improve coordination and use of ITS technologies are shown in Table 5.2.1.4.3.
According to the lessons derived from the 2011 Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant accident, a new concept for managing disasters in nuclear engineering was proposed.
The report indicated that the notable characteristics of the nuclear power plant event, which occurred because of the 2011 Great East Japan earthquake, were that: a) a very wide area was affected, and b) the disaster was compounded by a huge tsunami; therefore, no disaster assistance could be expected from the wider area which was also affected.
The report also indicated that the fatal event at the nuclear power plant was actually a series of separate serious events which occurred in a chain manner. This rendered the nature of the risk time-dependent. As addressing the situation involved both human actions and time-variable hazards, the most appropriate actions to be taken did not remain the same as time progressed to prevent the worst scenario for each elemental risk.
From the aforementioned features, Takada proposed the risk concept be extended so as to incorporate simultaneous failures and time-dependency in risk evolution. For this, the new concept “Safety Burst” was proposed in the report as follows:
Safety burst indicates the physical state that after either a single failure of a part or simultaneous failure of portions of a big complex engineering system with possible large failure consequence is initiated, further damage is propagating and extending and finally the expected performance of the system becomes out of control.
Many key words were introduced for improving management in two major Safety Burst situations -chain reaction-type situations and simultaneous-type failures as shown in Figure 5.2.1.4.3.
Figure 5.2.1.4.3 Key Words Introduced in Chain-Reaction and Simultaneous Type of Disasters
Among these key words, the ones indicated below and are considered very important.